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ABSTRACT	
	 There	is	a	debate	in	academic	philosophy	and	psychology	of	whether	or	not	
children	can	or	should	do	philosophy.		Robert	Kitchener	asserts	that	due	to	cognitive	
limitations,	children	under	the	age	of	10	cannot	think	philosophically	(Kitchener,	1990).	
Murris	(2000)	challenges	Kitchener's	arguments	and	concludes	that	more	research	is	
needed.		Further,	this	is	a	period	during	which	children	show	individual	differences	and	
development	in	cognitive	capacity,	specifically	within	executive	function	relating	to	
conscious	control	that	may	influence	abstract	thought	(Zelazo	et	al.,	1997).		The	present	
study	assessed	7-	to	9-year-olds’	and	adults’	ability	to	answer	philosophical	questions	in	
relation	to	a	child-friendly	story.		We	examined	whether	differences	in	executive	
function	relate	to	adults’	and	children's	ability	to	contemplate	philosophical	questions,	
what	children’s	abilities	looked	like	in	comparison	to	adults,	and	whether	prompting	
adults	with	questions	related	to	issues	of	conformity	and	morality	will	influence	their	
likelihood	of	conforming	when	presented	with	a	later	conformity	task.		We	found	that	
working	memory	and	classification	in	college	is	related	to	higher	philosophical	scores	in	
adults	and	vocabulary	is	related	to	higher	philosophical	scores	in	children.		Despite	
differences	in	cognitive	development,	the	children	tested	outperformed	the	adults	on	
the	philosophical	reasoning	task.		The	adults	did	not	show	differences	between	the	non-
philosophically	questioned	participants	and	the	participants	that	received	the	
philosophy	questions	on	the	conformity	task.		Our	results	support	the	theory	that	
children,	even	those	under	the	age	of	ten,	can	engage	in	philosophical	discussion.
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Part	I:	A	Contemporary	Debate	
	 The	question	of	whether	or	not	children	are	capable	of	thinking	philosophically	
has	been	around	for	quite	some	time,	and	is	still	being	fiercely	debated.		In	this	first	part	
of	my	thesis,	I’ll	outline	the	way	this	issue	is	being	currently	debated	by	carefully	
examining	an	argument	between	two	contemporary	philosophers	of	education.		Richard	
Kitchener	(1990)	in	“Do	Children	Think	Philosophically?”	argues	that	children	do	not	
have	the	capacity	for	philosophy.		Karin	Murris	(2000)	in	“Can	Children	Do	Philosophy?”	
takes	the	opposite	approach	and	argues	that,	when	philosophy	is	properly	understood,	
there	is	no	reason	to	assume	that	children	cannot	philosophize.			
I	believe	that	Murris	wins	this	debate,	and,	in	the	course	of	summarizing	their	
respective	views,	will	offer	a	number	of	reasons	to	conclude	that	she	offers	the	stronger	
argument.	
I.1	Kitchener:	Children	Cannot	Philosophize	
	 Kitchener	bases	his	argument	against	children’s	abilities	to	engage	in	philosophy	
solely	on	psychologist	Jean	Piaget’s	writings.		Piaget	argues	that	children	are	simply	not	
cognitively	developed	enough	to	engage	in	philosophical	thought	and	conversation.		
There	are,	of	course,	cognitive	abilities	that	do	develop	with	age,	such	as	executive	
function.		Executive	function	refers	to	a	multitude	cognitive	processes,	such	as	cognitive	
flexibility	and	working	memory.		These	processes	can	be	tested,	for	example,	through	a	
series	of	tasks	in	which	a	participant	must	alternate	between	applying	different	rules	or	
repeating	a	series	of	numbers	backwards.		More	controversially,	Piaget	believed	that	
philosophical	reasoning	is	also	a	cognitive	ability	that	only	develops	with	age.		In	order	
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to	engage	in	philosophy,	one	must	be	able	to	“examine	lower	order	beliefs,	statements	
and	actions…	children	below,	say,	10	years	of	age	cannot,	according	to	Piaget,	think	
philosophically…	one	must	be	able	to	be	sufficiently	reflective,	to	engage	in	meta-
cognition,	to	‘think	about	thinking,’”	(pp.	419-20).		With	this	quotation,	Kitchener	
outlines	what	he	believes	is	required	of	philosophical	thought	and	reasoning.		Children,	
according	to	Kitchener,	simply	cannot	philosophize	because	they	have	not	developed	
the	cognitive	skills	to	reflect	on	their	opinions	and	thoughts.	
Kitchener,	following	Piaget,	calls	such	reflective	skills,	“formal	operational	
thought”	or	reasoning	in	a	“fully	formal-deductive	way.”		He	writes:	“According	to	
Piaget,	younger	children	can	engage	in	concrete	operational	thought,	but	not	formal	
operational	thought.		They	cannot	fully	engage	in	abstract	thought	(only	concrete	
thought);	they	cannot	consider	all	possible	hypothetical	outcomes	of	an	idea,”	(pp.419).		
Simply	put,	they	are	unable	to	engage	with	abstract	and	complex	concepts.		Kitchener	
agrees	with	Piaget	that	children	lack	this	seemingly	fundamental	cognitive	ability	that	is	
necessary	for	philosophical	thought.		
But	this	argument	that	children	cannot	engage	in	“formal”	thought	is	not	the	
only	argument	for	his	view.		He	also	states	on	page	421	that,	“[children]	have	no	
adequate	conception	of	what	it	is	for	something	to	be	adequate	evidence,	nor	how	
certain	evidence	must	be	before	one	can	be	said	to	know	it.”		Based	on	that	judgment,	
philosophical	thought	is	possessing	not	only	a	certain	type	of	knowledge	of	something,	
but	also	possessing	the	ability	to	reflect	upon	it.		This	differs	from	the	formal	thought	
argument	by	asserting	that	children	lack	the	necessary	knowledge	of	an	idea	that	is	
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required	to	reflect	upon	it.		Because	they	lack	the	basic	knowledge	of	an	idea,	they	can	
neither	engage	in	concrete	nor	abstract	thought.	
Kitchener	also	argues	that	the	reason	people	think	children	can	do	philosophy	is	
that	they	mistakenly	confuse	doing	philosophy	for	thinking	critically.		He	notes	there	is	
much	debate	about	what	it	means	to	do	each	of	things	and	clarifies	his	perspective.		
What	he	calls	“lower-order	logical	thinking”	refers	to	deductive	and	inductive	reasoning	
skills	and	is	synonymous	to	what	people	refer	to	as	“critical	thinking.”		What	is	
concerned	with	philosophy,	Kitchener	claims,	is	a	different	type	of	skill	set	called	“higher	
order	thinking.”		This	involves	a	more	complex	cognitive	function	that	involves	“nuanced	
judgement,	self-regulation	and	imposing	meaning…	children	can	engage	in	lower-order	
critical	thinking,	[they]	cannot	engage	in	this	higher	order	thinking,”	(pp.	421).		He	
concludes	that	“critical	thinking	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient	for	doing	philosophy,”	
(pp.423).		With	this,	we	have	established	that	abstract	formal	operational	thought	is	
required	for	philosophizing,	but	it	is	not	sufficient	for	it.			
Finally,	Kitchener	argues	that	children	cannot	lead	the	sort	of	life	requisite	of	
genuine	philosophy.		Philosophical	thought	demands	not	only	the	developmental	ability	
of	abstract,	formal	operational	thought,	but	applying	it	and	making	it	central	to	how	one	
leads	his/her	life.		This,	according	to	Kitchener,	is	what	adult	philosophers	do.		They	take	
abstract	ideas,	generalize	those	ideas	across	everyday	life,	and	apply	them	in	
accordance	with	decision	making.		They	are	able	to	reflect	on	their	beliefs	and	actions	
and	engage	in	“meta-cognition,	to	‘think	about	thinking,’”	(pp.420).		Kids,	after	being	
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taught	philosophy,	merely	forget	about	such	lessons	and	do	not	lead	their	lives	in	a	
philosophical	manner,	according	to	Kitchener	and	Piaget.	
In	summary,	Kitchener	has	offered	the	following	arguments:	1)	philosophical	
thought	is	formal	thought,	and	children	lack	the	capacity	for	formal	thought;	2)	
philosophical	thought	requires	recognizing	evidence	as	evidence,	and	children	have	no	
such	meta-cognitive	ability;	3)	even	though	children	can	think	critically,	their	critical	
thinking	is	not	sufficient	for	philosophical	thinking;	and	4)	unlike	genuine	philosophers,	
children	cannot	lead	a	truly	philosophical	life.	
I.2	Murris:	Children	Are	Proto-Philosophers	
According	to	Murris,	philosophy	should	not	be	thought	of	as	a	“body	of	
knowledge,”	but	as	a	“method	of	enquiring	into	very	fundamental	questions	that	do	not	
yield	to	the	methods	of	science,”	(pp.	261).		This,	simply	put,	means	that	philosophy	
should	be	taught	as	a	way	of	thinking	rather	than	its	own	distinct	discipline.		Murris	
claims	that	the	debate	of	philosophy,	as	pertaining	to	children,	is	particularly	
confounding	due	to	these	two	very	different	concepts	of	‘doing’	philosophy.		She	
reasons	that	“children	can,	and	do,	pick	up	‘the	general	spirit	of	activities’,	and	thus	are	
being	taught	a	philosophical	form	of	life…	[they]	are	introduced	to	philosophical	issues	
and	commitments…	that	make	philosophical	discourse	possible,”	(pp.	263).		By	
encouraging	reflective	and	inquisitive	thought,	we	can	teach	children	how	to	think	
philosophically.			
There	is	no	doubt	in	my	mind	that	Kitchener	would	disagree	with	this	view.		He	
claims	that	children	are	not	able	to	lead	a	philosophical	lifestyle	due	to	their	lack	of	
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meta-cognitive	abilities.		Murris	claims	that	they	are	leading	a	philosophical	life,	just	in	
their	own	way	as	their	cognitive	development	allows.		But	Kitchener	would	surely	say	
that	she	is	oversimplifying	the	matter	in	order	to	defend	the	claim	that	children	can	do	
philosophy.		I	believe	Murris	could	easily	respond	to	such	skepticism	with,	“If	thinking	of	
philosophy	in	this	particular	way	is,	in	fact,	‘oversimplifying	the	matter’	what	would	be	
the	issue	with	that?		We	oversimplify	concepts	of	every	subject	in	order	for	children	to	
understand.		Why	should	philosophy	be	any	different?”		To	understand	this,	let	us	look	
at	the	education	system.		When	children	enter	school,	they	are	taught	a	simple	concept	
that	acts	as	a	foundation	for	that	subject.		For	example,	you	do	not	teach	a	pre-
kindergartener	calculus.		You	must	first	teach	them	how	to	count,	then	how	to	
add/subtract,	then	how	to	multiply/divide,	etc.		Only	after	a	student	understands	how	
the	basic	and	necessary	functions	of	math	work	do	you	move	on	to	complex	
mathematical	concepts.		Similarly,	an	adult	that	is	fully	developed	but	has	not	been	
taught	these	functions	could	not	solve	even	a	basic	calculus	problem.		This,	I	believe,	is	
how	Murris	is	thinking	about	philosophy.		Children	should	be	exposed	to	philosophical	
ideas	and	reasoning	at	a	young	age	so	that	this	meta-cognitive	ability	is	encouraged	to	
fully	develop.		Philosophizing	should	be	looked	at	a	growth	process,	such	as	math,	not	
an	after	effect	of	development	that	should	be	delayed	until	adulthood.	
Murris	directly	challenges	Kitchener’s	claim	that	children	lack	a	meta-cognitive	
level	reflection;	she	disputes	that	they	cannot	“think	about	thinking.”	She	writes:	“In	
contrast	to	non-philosophically	trained	children	and	adults,	philosophically	trained	
children	do	have	an	inclination	to	think	about	their	own	thinking	in	that	they	think	and	
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talk	about	their	ideas	and	relate	them	to	what	other	children	have	said,	showing	the	
structure	of	the	dialogue	as	they	speak,”	(pp.	262).		Even	Kitchener	seems	to	
acknowledge	that	children	can	sometimes	think	in	this	sense,	however,	he	refutes	that	it	
is	evidence	of	their	capability.		
Kitchener,	in	the	face	of	such	examples,	nevertheless	claims	that	they	are	not	
doing	“real”	philosophy,	and	denies	that	these	examples	prove	that	children	are	
“philosophically	trained.”		Kitchener	looks	at	cases	of	“philosophical”	dialogues	with	
children	not	as	‘doing	real	philosophy,’	but	simply	as	incidents	of	“philosophical	one-
liners”	(Kitchener,	1990,	pp.	426)	that	show	no	evidence	of	anything	other	than	
concrete	philosophical	ability.	
Murris	makes	a	number	of	insightful	responses	to	Kitchener’s	claim	that	students	
are	simply	giving	“philosophical	one-liners”	rather	than	engaging	in	sustained	
philosophy.		First,	even	if	we	were	to	agree	that	children	are	not	doing	philosophy	in	the	
full	sense	of	the	word,	“…	the	conclusion	does	not	follow	that	children	should	not	be	
taught	philosophy.			After	all,	primary	school	children	do	not	‘do’,	for	example,	
mathematics	or	history	as	capably	as	professional	mathematicians	and	historians.		Does	
it,	therefore,	follow	that	either	they	do	not	do	‘real	mathematics	or	history,	or	that	they	
should	not	do	those	subjects?”	(pp.	263).			Murris	is	pointing	out	a	flaw	in	Kitchener’s	
argument:	it	is	a	non-sequitur	to	say	that	because	children	cannot,	using	my	previous	
example,	engage	in	calculus	that	they	should	not	be	taught	math.		I	feel	as	though	the	
opposite	would	be	intuitive,	that	in	order	for	one	to	eventually	and	fully	engage	in	
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calculus	to	the	best	of	their	ability,	that	it	is	imperative	and	necessary	for	the	
foundations	of	calculus	to	be	taught	at	every	level	of	development.			
In	response	to	Kitchener’s	argument	that	children	cannot	engage	in	a	
philosophical	life,	Murris	counters	that	he	has	assumed	an	overly	restrictive	conception	
of	philosophical	reflection,	and	falsely	believes	that	the	philosopher	must	be	someone	
who,	in	complete	isolation,	engages	in	solitary	thought.		Murris	says	“only	questioning	
will	bring	out	to	what	extent	[children]	are	capable	of	sustaining	this	philosophical	way	
of	thinking…	if	children	are	‘questioned	on	a	one-on-one	basis	about	their	comments’	
and	could	‘elaborate	upon	their	views,	and	rationally	defend	them’”	(pp.	264).		One	of	
the	main	weaknesses	in	Kitchener’s	argument	is	his	claim	that	children	cannot	partake	
in	a	philosophically	based	conversation.		If	we	are	not	encouraging	this	behavior	with	
them,	how	do	we	expect	them	to?		We	must	involve	them	in	this	type	of	conversation	
and	instead	of	taking	their	“philosophical	one-lines”	as	a	sign	that	this	is	their	
philosophical	limit,	lead	them	to	further	examine	them.		Murris	believes	that	Kitchener	
is	excluding	the	value	of	group	thought	and	that	children’s	ability	to	question	and	
defend	one	another	should	also	be	considered	as	exhibiting	philosophical	thought.		This	
kind	of	group	reflection	has	long	been	considered	a	kind	of	philosophical	reflection;	
after	all,	this	is	what	we	see	with	the	Socratic	method	and	in	much	of	Plato’s	works.	
I	think	Murris	could	even	press	this	point	further:	what	if	the	way	children	do	
philosophy	together	and	in	joint	dialogue	is	actually	better	than	only	leading	a	solitary	
philosophical	life?		This	is	the	view	of	Gareth	Mathews	who	says	that	children	are	
natural	philosophers	and	that	cultivated	adult	philosophers	would	be	better	at	engaging	
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with	philosophy	if	they	had	more	of	the	natural	innocence	of	a	child	(pp.	266).		
Moreover,	following	Ludwig	Wittgenstein’s	proposal	that	misconceptions	of	language	
create	philosophical	problems,	Mathews	argues	that	by	introducing	philosophical	ideas	
at	a	young	age,	we	would	be	helping	to	avoid	later,	unnecessary	problems.		Because	
they	have	not	yet	formed	biases,	children	can	philosophize	without	misconceptions	(pp.	
266).				
This	idea,	could	of	course	be	challenged	as	well.		Someone	with	the	same	
viewpoint	as	Kitchener	could	argue	that	even	if	children	have	basic	cognitive	ability,	and	
can	engage	in	some	joint	dialogue,	they	will	still	not	have	enough	experience	of	reality	
to	be	able	to	philosophize	about	it.		For	example,	children	can	discuss	morality,	but	
because	they	do	not	have	extended	experience	with	moral	dilemmas	and	consequences	
thereof,	they	are	not	able	to	thoroughly	explore	the	philosophical	ideas	of	morality.			
Murris	anticipates	that	someone	might	make	this	very	argument	on	page	267:	if	
knowledge	comes	from	experience,	then	children,	according	to	those	whose	views	align	
with	Kitchener,	cannot	do	philosophy	due	to	their	lack	of	sufficient	experience.		Murris	
has	a	response	to	this	worry:	“it	does	not	follow	that	they	do	not	have	sufficient	
experience	to	reflect,	or	that	philosophical	reflection	will	not	help	them	make	their	
experiences	more	meaningful	to	them,”	(pp.	267).		It	is	obvious	that	children	have	
significantly	less	experiences	that	adults,	but	it	does	not	stand	to	reason	that	they	are	
unable	to	reflect	on	(the	admittedly	limited)	experiences	they	have	undergone.		
		 13	
Murris	also	draws	on	John	White’s	view	to	refute	the	charge	that	children	do	not	
have	enough	experience	for	philosophy.		White	claims	that	the	context	of	the	question	
and	the	intention	of	the	questioner	is	essential	in	determining	whether	a	question	holds	
philosophical	thought	(pp.	268).		Regardless	of	experience,	the	intent	of	the	child	is	what	
is	determinant	of	engaging	in	philosophical	thought.		“Philosophical	concepts	distinguish	
themselves	from	those	of	everyday	life	by	their	generality,	by	their	abstract	character,	
but	especially	by	their	complexity…	the	class	of	concepts	enquired	into	by	children,	
however,	is	larger	than	that	of	traditional	philosophy,”	(pp.	269).		While	children	have	
not	experienced	enough	to	fully	partake	in	abstract	philosophical	ideas	and	the	
consequences	thereof,	they	can	still	think	abstractly	about	the	experiences	they	have	
had,	and	the	hypothetical	situations	they	have	entertained.	
Moreover,	although	I	agree	with	White	that	children	are	entertaining	a	larger	
class	of	concepts	than	adult	philosophers	since	they	are	generating	broad	questions	
themselves,	I	do	not	agree	with	White	that	genuine	philosophical	thought	necessitates	
complexity.		Ideas	can	be	simple	and	philosophical,	such	as	good	versus	bad	actions.		
Are	the	questions	that	follow	an	idea,	then,	what	makes	a	thought	philosophical?		Or	
could	these	two	notions	be	independently	philosophical?		This	requires	further	thought	
that	Murris	did	not	explore.	
In	summary,	Murris	combats	Kitchener’s	first	claim	that	philosophical	thought	is	
formal	thought,	and	children	lack	the	capacity	for	formal	thought	by	arguing	that	
philosophy	should	be	thought	of	as	a	method	of	enquiry,	not	as	a	separate	body	of	
knowledge.		Murris	argues	that	Kitchener’s	second	and	third	claim	that	philosophical	
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thought	requires	recognizing	evidence	as	evidence,	and	children	have	no	such	meta-
cognitive	ability	to	reflect,	and	even	though	children	can	think	critically,	their	critical	
thinking	is	not	sufficient	for	philosophical	thinking	is	synonymous	with	the	idea	that	
while	they	are	not	mathematicians,	they	are	capable	of	doing	math.		This	idea	
emphasizes	Murris’	belief	that	philosophical	training	should	be	a	process	throughout	
one’s	life.		Kitchener’s	last	claim	that,	unlike	genuine	philosophers,	children	cannot	lead	
a	truly	philosophical	life	is	denied	by	Murris	by	her	claiming	that	they	are	leading	a	life	
of	philosophical	inquiry	as	best	their	cognitive	abilities	allow,	and	this	should	not	be	
dismissed	as	insufficient.	
I.3	Conclusion	
No	one	can	doubt	that	age	plays	some	role	in	determining	the	developing	
cognitive	capacities.		However,	I	have	shown	in	this	chapter	that	Kitchener	makes	an	
error	when	he	infers	from	this	fact	that	children	cannot	philosophize.				His	perspective,	
is	as	previously	mentioned,	founded	on	Jean	Piaget’s	theory,	which	Murris	also	makes	
note	of,	that	“children’s	reasoning	will	develop	automatically	as	they	get	older,”	(pp.	
270).			But	how,	exactly,	these	cognitive	capacities	develop,	and	which	cognitive	
capacities	develops,	is	contingent	on	many	factors,	not	age	alone.		To	assume	a	simple	
story	of	development,	instead	of	a	complicated	and	contingent	development,	is	to	
ignore	decades	of	biological	and	psychological	research.		To	make	assumptions	about	
philosophical	ability	based	on	the	simple	story	is,	I	hope	to	have	shown,	also	misguided.	
Nevertheless,	though	I	have	shown	that	Kitchener’s	arguments	that	children	
cannot	philosophize	are	weak,	I	have	not	provided	much	to	support	the	claim	that	
		 15	
children	can	engage	in	philosophy.		Rather	than	simply	knocking	Kitchener	down	with	
Murris’	counter-arguments,	I	would	like	to	offer	additional	evidence	that	will	support	
Murris’s	arguments	and	give	us	reasons	to	believe	that	children	are	philosophers.		In	
Parts	II	and	III	of	this	thesis,	I’ll	offer	two	positive	arguments.	
In	Part	II,	I	will	offer	a	historical	argument.		Both	Kitchener	and	Murris	seem	to	
think	that	the	possibility	of	children	philosophers	is	a	very	recent	hypothesis.		However,	
I	will	show	in	that	the	possibility	for	children	philosophers	has	been	recognized	almost	
since	the	beginning	of	philosophy	in	ancient	Greece.		In	other	words,	people	from	a	very	
different	time	and	place	than	our	own	seemed	to	recognize	that	children	were	
philosophizing,	and	I	think	this	can	count	as	evidence	to	support	my	thesis.	
In	Part	III,	I	will	share	results	from	a	study	that	I	have	designed	to	test	children’s	
executive	functions	that	was	carried	out	in	a	cognitive	and	developmental	psychology	
research	lab.		The	study	involves	testing	cognitive	development	through	executive	
functions	and	a	philosophical	discussion	in	which	children’s	responses	were	recorded	
and	scaled,	testing	their	ability	to	think	freely	for	themselves.		I	believe	finding	the	
correlation	in	these	aspects	might	be	a	way	in	which	to	gain	perspective	on	the	matter	
without	conducting	longitudinal	experiments.		The	results	of	this	study,	I	will	argue,	
offer	data	which	supports	an	empirical	argument	for	my	thesis	that	children	under	the	
age	of	ten	are	capable	of	philosophizing.	
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Part	2:	Historical	Argument		
In	the	last	part	of	my	thesis,	I	asserted	that	to	imply	children	are	not	capable	of	
philosophical	reasoning	due	to	a	lack	of	fully	developed	cognition	is	not	a	valid	
argument.		I	did	so	through	the	debate	of	Kitchener	and	Murris.		Many	people	might	
assume	that	the	idea	of	children	philosophers	is	a	very	contemporary	idea.		They	
probably	think	this	not	only	because	children	only	very	recently	became	the	subject	of	
extensive	research	(and	only	recently	became	protected	by	rights),	but	also	because	
they	believe	that	all	the	most	famous	philosophers	reserved	philosophy	for	adult	
activity.	
In	this	part	of	my	thesis,	I’d	like	to	show	that	the	prospect	of	children	
philosophers	is	not	simply	a	recent	proposal.		It	has	been	said	that,	“The	safest	general	
characterization	of	the	European	philosophical	tradition	is	that	it	consists	of	a	series	of	
footnotes	to	Plato,”	(Alfred	North	Whitehead,	in	Process	and	Reality),	and	I’d	like	to	
argue	that	Plato	himself	believed	that	children	could	philosophize.		
In	Plato’s	work	The	Republic,	Socrates	proposes	finding	what	justice	is	in	a	
perfect	city	so	that	justice	can	be	found	in	an	individual’s	soul.		To	do	so,	he	imagines	a	
perfect,	luxurious,	peaceful	city	in	which	all	citizens	are	craftsmen	in	the	field	which	they	
are	best	suited	for.		This,	Socrates	claims,	is	justice	in	the	city	(434c).		A	city	of	this	
nature	would	require	a	strong	preventative	measure	against	war.		Warfare	is	a	craft	and	
therefore	has	craftsmen	which	are	called	the	guardians.		Socrates	asserts	that	this	craft	
being	carried	out	well	is	critical	to	the	success	of	the	city:	“…	the	guardians’	job	is	of	the	
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greatest	importance,	it	requires	the	most	freedom	from	other	things,	as	well	the	
greatest	craft	and	practice,”	(374e).	
But	the	reason	that	the	craft	of	the	guardians	is	so	important	isn’t	just	that	the	
city	needs	good	soldiers	for	war.		Rather,	Plato	thinks	the	best	of	these	guardians	will	
eventually	go	on	to	serve	as	rulers	for	the	entire	city.		Thus,	because	these	guardians	are	
the	foundation	of	the	city	and	vital	to	its	being	ruled	successfully,	their	upbringing	is	
essential	in	becoming	the	optimal	guardians.		Thus,	the	educational	system	he	puts	forth	
is	quite	detailed	and	has	specific	goals	for	the	different	age	stages.			
Due	to	the	way	in	which	the	educational	system	is	set	up,	some	might	take	it	to	
mean	that	one	cannot	philosophize	until	the	final	stage	of	50+	years	of	age	has	been	
reached	and	one	has	acquired	a	perfect	understanding	of	the	Forms.		Ariel	Dillon	in	her	
paper	“Education	in	Plato’s	Republic”	states:	
Finally,	at	the	age	of	fifty,	those	who	have	excelled	in	everything	will	perceive	the	
good	and	will	alternate	philosophizing	and	ruling	the	city	[…]		through	a	rigorous	
philosophical	education,	the	city	unshackles	individuals	and	leads	them	out	of	
the	cave	of	ignorance	and	into	the	light	of	knowledge	so	that	they	are	eventually	
able	to	go	back	into	the	cave	and	teach	others.	
	
One	might	infer	this	to	support	the	idea	of	philosophizing	after	the	age	of	fifty.		
However,	Plato	never	explicitly	makes	this	distinction	of	when	someone	is	able	to	
philosophize	or	that	the	final	stage	of	education	would	be	when	one	is	able.		In	fact,	I	
believe	he	thinks	the	opposite.		The	basis	of	his	educational	system	lies	in	the	belief	that	
children	have	a	natural	inclination	for	philosophical	thought.		Plato	constructed	an	
entire	society,	and	this	system,	on	the	notion	of	children’s	intuitions.		He	aims	at	the	
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development	of	such	intuitions,	which	could	not	be	fostered	if	they	are	not	already	
present.	
I	will	argue	that	the	way	in	which	Plato	sets	up	the	educational	system	and	what	
it	demands	of	the	children	guardians	is	evidence	that	he	believes	children	are	capable	of	
philosophical	thought	and	that	the	system	itself	has	merit	in	fostering	such	capabilities.		
First,	I	will	talk	about	the	attributes	of	the	guardians.		Second,	I	will	discuss	the	different	
aspects	of	their	education	and	argue	that	they	are	all	philosophical	in	nature.		Lastly,	I	
will	describe	the	different	stages	of	their	lives	and	how	I	believe	their	philosophical	
thought	develops	in	each.	
II.1	The	Attributes	of	Young	Guardians	Include	Philosophy	
My	first	argument	that	Plato	believes	in	philosophical	children	is	very	straight-
forward:	when	Plato	lists	the	traits	that	young	guardians	must	have	if	they	are	to	be	
successful,	he	lists	“being	philosophical”	as	one	of	the	traits.		He	says	that	the	attributes	
the	guardians	should	naturally	have	to	be	considered	best	suited	for	the	job	include	
being	“a	lover	of	learning	and	a	philosopher…	[and	possessing]	spirit,	speed,	and	
strength”	(376c).		They	are	physically	agile,	strong,	sharp-eyed,	courageous,	like	a	noble	
dog	–	gentle	to	those	they	know	and	violent	to	those	they	do	not,	spirited,	and	
philosophical	(375a	–	376c).		On	the	face	of	it,	this	looks	like	evidence	that	Plato	
attributes	philosophy	to	children.	
Now	some	readers,	however,	might	protest	that	Plato	is	not	here	describing	
genuine	philosophy	in	these	passages.		After	all,	Plato	also	calls	dogs	philosophical	in	the	
previous	quotation	–	and	one	might	worry	that	the	dog-type	of	philosophy	that	Plato	is	
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attributing	to	the	guardians	isn’t	very	philosophical.		Consider	this,	why	should	what	
might	be	deemed	as	a	lower-level	of	philosophy	translate	to	not	philosophical	at	all?		
There	are	lower	levels	of	all	subjects	in	education,	does	that	make	them	less	
educational,	or	more	fitting	for	someone	at	that	level?		
Moreover,	skeptics	may	argue	that	the	“philosophy”	Plato	is	finding	in	young	
guardians	is	not	genuine	because	it	is	being	forced	upon	them	as	part	of	a	rigid	
education.		Some	skeptics	might	say	that	in	confining	them,	Plato	is	taking	away	the	
ability	to	choose	between	duty	and	temptation,	and	therefore	they	are	philosophers	by	
force	and	not	as	part	of	a	life-choice.		However,	whether	their	education	is	flexible	or	
rigid	misses	the	point:	Plato’s	goal	is	to	describe	an	education	that	will	optimally	
develop	these	philosophical	attributes.		In	order	for	the	philosophical	intuitions	they	
exhibit	at	a	young	age	to	evolve,	and	to	prime	them	for	such	an	involved	and	vital	job,	
guardians	must	be	properly	educated.			This	is	why	Plato	will	not	allow	young	guardians	
to	be	distracted,	and	why	he	recommends	such	tight	controls	on	story-telling.		Without	
such	protections,	Plato	believes	they	would	indulge	in	the	evils	of	other	citizens,	such	as	
temptations	and	other	actions	associated	with	the	appetitive	portion	of	the	soul	(416c	&	
434d	–	441c).		Now	we	might	disagree	with	Plato’s	educational	tactics.		But	whether	or	
not	this	lifestyle	is	forced	upon	guardians	is	irrelevant	to	the	point	I’m	making:	Plato	
believes	the	proper	education	can	develop	philosophical	abilities.	
The	final	worry	a	skeptic	might	have	is	that	Plato’s	children	are	not	genuinely	
philosophical	because	they	are	malleable.		Skeptics	could	say	that	because	children	are	
inexperienced	and	feeble	minded,	they	are	not	engaging	in	philosophical	thought,	but	
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questioning	the	workings	of	the	world	in	order	to	learn	how	to	operate	in	it.		It	is	true	
that	Plato	thinks	of	children	as	very	malleable,	in	both	mind	and	body,	but	this	
malleability,	I	believe,	does	not	hinder	them	as	skeptics	might	pose.		Even	if	this	is	the	
case,	I	do	not	think	it	justifiable	to	write	off	their	malleability	and	behavior	as	non-
philosophical.	Rather,	I	think	their	malleability	enables	them	to	better	grasp	abstract	
concepts.		I	believe	their	lack	of	preconceived	notions	and	biases	towards	
epistemological	and	metaphysical	subject	matter	allows	them	to	think	and	reason	
outside	the	boxes	of	social	formalities.		They	can	contemplate	difficult	challenges	
presented	to	them	and	offer	responses	devoid	of	previously	imposed	influences,	and	
thus	have	genuine,	self-articulated	ideas.			
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II.2	The	Philosophical	Education	of	the	Guardians	
Next	I	will	argue	that	the	education	that	Plato	proposes	for	young	guardians	–	an	
education	with	is	systematic	and	strategic	–	is	squarely	focused	on	developing	a	
philosophical	ability.			
The	first	aspect	of	their	education	includes	storytelling	and	poetry.		Socrates	
recommends	epics	for	storytelling	because	in	comedies	and	tragedies	there	is	violence,	
immorality,	animals,	forces	of	nature,	etc.	and	the	guardians	should	not	imitate	such	
acts.		Instead,	Socrates	says	they	should	imitate	“people	who	are	courageous,	
temperate,	pious,	free.	.	.”	(395c4-5).		Socrates	suggests	editing	the	content	of	stories	so	
that	children	only	see	the	gods	as	benevolent	and	heroes	as	courageous	and	selfless.		I	
believe	this	is	important	to	the	development	of	their	beliefs	about	their	duties.		The	
guardians	must	hold	the	safety	of	the	city	as	their	main	priority	and	act	courageous	and	
selfless	in	all	they	do.		They	must	not	fear	death	or	loss	as	some	heroes	in	poetry	fear	
the	wrath	of	the	gods	and	mourn	the	loss	of	loved	ones.		While	the	stories	censor	
depictions	that	would	provoke	the	imitation	of	such	behaviors,	the	children	are	still	
challenged	with	epistemological,	metaphysical,	and	even	moral	questions	to	foster	
philosophical	thought.			
Another	reason	Socrates	recommends	epics	as	opposed	to	plays,	is	that	the	
talent	of	the	actors	could	deter	the	guardians	from	their	purpose.		The	guardians	could	
grow	to	admire	and	imitate	the	actors,	hindering	their	potential	to	become	philosopher-
kings.	Socrates	suggests	that	to	avoid	this,	the	storyteller	should	be	“more	austere	and	
less	pleasant”	(398b).		By	controlling	the	style	in	which	the	guardians	are	taught,	this	
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decreases	the	risk	of	indulging	in	temptations	and	imitations	not	in	accordance	with	the	
ideals	of	guardianship.		Childhood	is	the	prime	time	for	such	ideals	to	be	instilled.		
I	believe	that	epics	would	also	be	best	in	order	to	prevent	centralization	of	
thought.		The	children	are	free	to	form	their	own	ideas	about	the	issues,	lessons,	and	
implications	of	the	stories	as	opposed	to	having	the	ideas	acted	out	before	them,	which	
the	actors	might	influence	defectively	(398b).		By	listening	to	the	stories,	they	are	able	
to	focus	on	the	abstract	concepts	rather	than	the	concrete	details	(i.e.,	theatrical	
particulars),	which	might	hinder	their	ability	to	recognize	and	think	about	the	forms.		
Because	Plato	restricts	storytelling	to	epics,	it	seems	to	suggest	their	energies	and	
capacities	would	be	channeled	into	becoming	optimal	guardians	by	giving	them	the	
freedom	to	form	their	personal	convictions.		Freely	forming	one’s	own	ideas,	opinions,	
and	beliefs	is	the	core	of	philosophical	engagement.		
The	next	part	of	their	education	is	musical	training.		Speech,	harmony,	and	
rhythm	are	the	features	of	songs	that	work	together	to	induce	specific	emotions.		While	
they	will	be	trained	in	each	of	these	areas	and	how	they	influence	one	another,	they	will	
not	be	trained	in	all	types	of	music	because	the	guardians	are	to	remain	temperate	and	
courageous;	they	should	not	listen	to	lamenting	or	overly	joyous	music	(399b).		Musical	
training	strengthens	their	sensitivity	to	melodies,	rhythm,	intricate	harmonies,	order,	
beauty,	chaos,	etc.,	which	Plato	believes	is	vital	to	them	becoming	optimal	guardians.		
This	musical	training	is	philosophical	because,	I	believe,	it	is	the	beginning	of	their	
training	of	the	Form	of	the	Good.		If	they	can	comprehend	what	is	required	of	a	perfect	
piece	of	music,	they	are	enabled	to	discern	perfections,	imperfections,	and	shadow	
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copies	as	described	in	Plato’s	Allegory	of	the	Cave	(which	I	will	expound	upon	in	the	last	
section).		Plato	states	that	“anyone	who	has	been	properly	trained,	will	quickly	notice	if	
something	has	been	omitted	from	a	thing,	or	if	that	thing	has	not	been	well	crafted	or	
well	grown…	he	will	recognize	the	reason	when	it	comes	and	recognize	it	easily	because	
of	its	kinship	with	himself,”	(401e	-	402a).		To	put	plainly,	due	to	their	ability	to	
understand	and	identify	complex	qualities	in	music,	they	can	generalize	it	across	other	
aspects	of	life.		Taking	an	abstract	concept	and	applying	it	is	engaging	in	philosophical	
reasoning.		Such	a	task	is	a	high	demand	of	cognitive	capacity	and	because	it	is	a	crucial	
part	of	their	early	education,	it	is	evidence	that	Plato	believes	them	to	be	capable	of	
philosophy	at	a	young	age.	
The	last	component	of	their	education	is	physical	training,	which	is	more	
complex	than	mere	brawn.		While	strength	is	important,	a	buff	athlete	does	not	equate	
to	a	proper	guardian.		The	guardians	must	remain	healthy	both	in	mind	and	body.		This	
means	they	are	not	to	indulge	in	appetites	and	desires,	but	to	remain	balanced.		By	
combining	the	three	elements	of	education,	Socrates	postulates	that	the	guardians	will	
be	harmonized	warriors	(411e	–	412a).		If	they	were	to	only	receive	the	storytelling	and	
musical	training,	they	would	not	be	fierce	enough	and	therefore	not	fit	to	protect.		If	
they	were	to	receive	only	physical/athletic	training,	they	would	become	egotistical,	
savage,	and	imprudent.		However,	a	poet-philosopher	warrior	would	appreciate	each	
aspect	and	be	a	well-rounded,	fit	academic.		Plato’s	tenacity	to	educate	the	young	in	
such	a	way	that	they	develop	into	balanced	and	harmonized	warriors,	rather	than	
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merely	physically	fit	fighters,	is	another	sign	that	he	believes	the	young	are	capable	of	
philosophical	reasoning.		
They	must	also	partake	in	rigorous	tests	and	trials	to	continue	passed	each	stage.		
The	tests	are	not	only	physical,	but	also	emotional,	intellectual,	and	psychological.		I	
believe	Plato’s	idea	was	that	their	previous	philosophical	priming	allows	them	to	pass	
these	tests	which	hinge	upon	how	well	balanced	their	souls	are	thus	far.		413c:	
…	we	must	look	for	those	who	are	the	best	guardians	of	the	indwelling	
conviction	that	what	they	have	to	do	is	what	they	at	any	time	believe	to	be	best	
for	the	state.	Then	we	must	observe	them	from	childhood	up	and	propose	them	
tasks	in	which	one	would	be	most	likely	to	forget	this	principle	or	be	deceived,	
and	he	whose	memory	is	sure	and	who	cannot	be	beguiled	we	must	accept	and	
the	other	kind	we	must	cross	off	from	our	list.	Is	not	that	so?”	“Yes.”	“And	again	
we	must	subject	them	to	toils	and	pains	and	competitions	in	which	we	have	to	
watch	for	the	same	traits.”	
	
Without	the	educational	system	set	up	as	it	is,	it	would	be	unlikely	for	them	to	endure	
such	tasks	and	become	optimal	guardians.		Again,	even	at	a	young	age	I	believe	he	
thinks	children	and	pre-teens	are	capable	of	withstanding	intense	cognitive	testing	due	
to	the	developed	capacities	of	philosophical	thought.	414c:	
…	a	good	guardian	of	himself	and	the	culture	which	he	has	received,	maintaining	
the	true	rhythm	and	harmony	of	his	being	in	all	those	conditions,	and	the	
character	that	would	make	him	most	useful	to	himself	and	to	the	state.	And	he	
who	as	boy,	lad,	and	man	endures	the	test	and	issues	from	it	unspoiled	we	must	
establish	as	ruler	over	our	city	and	its	guardian…	
	
If	these	natural	inclinations	for	philosophy	were	not	present	and	developed,	they	would	
not	be	able	to	progress	in	their	training	and	would	move	on	to	another	craft.		I	believe	
this	is	a	physical	manifestation	of	their	philosophical	training	that	implements	their	
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capacities.		The	guardians	have	to	incorporate	their	physical	training	into	how	they	think	
about	the	city	and	justice.		Without	their	philosophical	training	fighting	would	be	
pointless.		It	is	not	a	lesson	in	and	of	itself,	rather	it	is	a	compilation	of	all	they	have	
learned.		Of	course,	with	the	advancement	of	the	stages,	it	will	be	easier	to	determine	
the	true	philosophers.		To	reiterate,	this	does	not	imply	that	the	earlier	stages	lack	true	
philosophical	engagement.	
II.3	Philosophical	Life-Stages	
In	Part	I	of	my	thesis,	I	argued	that	while	children	may	not	be	engaging	in	higher-
order	thought,	they	are	still	philosophizing	as	best	as	their	cognition	allows.		This	is	
similar	to	how	children	are	not	mathematicians,	but	they	comprehend	mathematical	
concepts	and	are	capable	of	applying	and	using	them	(Murris,	2000).	
I	believe	we	find	this	same	idea	in	Plato’s	Meno	and	Phaedo.		In	Meno,	Plato	says	
that	learning	is	remembering	(81d)	and	in	Phaedo	that	“knowledge	does	not	come	from	
sense-perception,	we	must	have	acquired	it	before	we	acquired	sense-perception,	that	
is,	before	we	were	born,”	(75b).		Due	to	exposure	to	the	Forms	before	birth,	children	
can	detect	and	engage	in	philosophy	and	with	the	Forms.		Naturally,	as	an	individual	
advances	higher	in	the	age	stages,	they	are	engaging	in	philosophical	thought	on	a	
deeper	and	more	meaningful	level,	but	that	does	not	negate	the	abilities	of	those	in	
earlier	stages.			But	it	is	significant	that	Plato’s	theory	of	learning	as	recollection	implies	
that	children	–	even	new-born	children	–	have	access	to	philosophical	objects	of	
thought.	
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In	the	Republic,	Plato	describes	the	different	stages	of	ideal	education	for	
different	age	groups	and	the	corresponding	curriculum:	
Stage	1	Ages	1-15:	Music,	poetry,	athletics.		(I	have	already	explained	the	philosophical	
nature	of	this	stage).	
Stage	2	Ages	16-19:	Labors,	studies,	fears,	compulsory	physical	training,	coping	with	
stress.		In	this	stage,	they	are	faced	with	physical,	intellectual,	psychological,	and	moral	
challenges.		These	would	include,	but	not	be	limited	to,	athletic	competitions,	
intellectual	competitions	(e.g.,	debates),	facing	and	overcoming	fears,	and	challenges	to	
ascertain	that	they	put	the	well-being	of	the	city	over	their	individual	self-preservation.		
To	conquer	these	exhaustive	trials,	they	must	rely	on	the	training	from	the	previous	
stage	and	their	studies	throughout	this	one.		Their	body,	psychology,	and	soul	must	be	
well-ordered	and	in	harmony	with	one	another.		Here	we	can	see	Plato	attributing	
philosophical	capacities	of	having	their	personal	convictions	challenged	and	acting	in	
accordance	with	them	and	to	the	16-19	year	olds.	
Stage	3	Ages	20-29:	In	this	stage,	they	must	try	to	unify	their	knowledge	into	a	vision	
that	culminates	into	the	Form	of	the	Good.		This,	Plato	asserts,	is	the	highest	point	of	
knowledge.		They	cannot	fully	comprehend	the	Form	of	the	Good	at	this	time,	but	they	
have	a	vision	of	how	to	get	there	and	understand	the	importance	of	that.	
Stage	4	Ages	30-35:	In	this	stage,	it	is	determined	who	can	go	beyond	the	realm	of	the	
mathematical	sciences,	using	dialectic.		For	example,	who	can	abandon	the	senses	and	
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follow	an	argument	logically?	And,	what	is	the	relationship	between	beauty	and	justice,	
the	one	and	the	many,	etc.?	
Stage	5	Ages	35-50:		At	this	stage,	they	must	go	into	the	city	and	hold	an	administrative	
job	for	15	years.	Examples	of	this	would	be	an	officer/general	in	the	army,	road	
efficiency	and	maintenance,	grain	distribution,	etc.		With	this,	they	will	be	able	to	
understand	everything	the	physical	world	with	an	appreciation	of	the	forms.	
Stage	6	Ages	50+:	This	stage	is	the	graduation	to	Philosopher	King.		They	can	think	about	
the	nature	of	the	Good	and	how	to	implement	the	Good.		One	at	this	stage	has	a	full	
grasp	of	the	Forms.	
We	can	see	these	multiple	stages	of	education	illustrated	in	the	Allegory	of	the	
Cave	and	the	Divided	Line	analogies.		The	inside	of	the	cave	is	the	physical	world	or	the	
realm	of	opinion/becoming	and	probably	the	first	two	stages	of	education.		The	
shadows	on	the	wall	are	shadows/reflections/and	other	things	you	can	sense	and	
perceive.		The	objects	that	create	the	shadows	are	beliefs/physical	objects	and	within	
the	stages,	the	curriculum	the	guardians	have	learned	are	only	
copies/shadows/reflections	of	the	Forms.		The	mouth	of	the	cave	is	the	division	
between	the	physical	realm	and	the	realm	of	intellect/ideas	and	being,	this	would	be	
the	tests	they	undergo	to	determine	who	carries	on	in	the	training.		Outside	of	the	cave	
is	the	realm	of	intellect	and	being;	this	is	stage	three	where	the	guardians	form	a	unified	
vision	of	all	they	have	learned.		The	objects	outside	the	cave	are	synonymous	with	
thought	and	mathematics.		Just	passing	this	point	would	be	stage	four	where	they	are	
challenged	to	think	beyond	mathematics	and	abandon	the	senses	to	contemplate	the	
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Forms	and	non-perceptibles.		This	would	carry	over	to	stage	five	where	they	have	
acquired	the	knowledge	to	understand	reality	and	the	compresence	of	opposites	with	
an	appreciation	of	the	Forms.		Lastly,	we	reach	the	Sun	which	is	symbolic	of	the	Forms.		
In	the	last	stage	of	the	guardians’	lives,	they	grasp	the	Forms	in	their	entirety	and	
implement	them.			
Significantly,	the	Allegory	of	the	Cave	gives	us	that	much	more	reason	to	think	
that	Plato	believed	in	philosophical	children.		Children	are	inquisitive	and	curious	(as	
was	the	slave	that	escaped	the	cave)	and	they	have	the	capabilities	and	attributions	
within	them	to	ascend	the	cave,	to	learn	and	grow,	and	enlighten	others.	 	
II.4	Conclusion	
In	this	part	of	my	paper,	I	have	argued	that	there	is	historical	evidence,	in	
addition	to	contemporary	thought,	to	support	the	idea	that	children	are	capable	of	
philosophical	reasoning.		Due	to	the	elements	and	implications	of	this	educational	
system,	I	believe	that	those	with	inherent	philosophical	inclinations	and	intuitions	could	
successfully	reach	a	high	level	of	philosophical	skill.		I	do	not	believe	that	Plato	would	
spend	such	a	substantial	amount	of	time	sketching	out	this	system	and	city	if	he	did	not	
hold	the	same	belief	to	be	true.		Thus,	I	reject	the	largely	mistaken	claim	that	Plato	did	
not	believe	children	possessed	the	ability	to	engage	in	philosophical	thought	and	this	
system	is	purely	theoretical	with	no	real	application	or	value	in	implementation.	
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Part	3:	Empirical	Data		
	 Murris	concluded	that	further	research	needs	to	be	done	in	the	debate	of	
whether	or	not	children	can	do	philosophy.		Because	much	of	the	debate	centers	around	
children’s	cognitive	development,	I	designed	a	study	to	assess	both	cognitive	and	
philosophical	reasoning	skills.		Empirical	data	on	whether	cognition	is	related	to	
philosophic	ability	would	be	informative	to	claims	against	the	encouragement	of	
engagement	in	philosophical	discussions	with	children	in	that	they	would	clarify	the	
level	to	which	children	are	capable.			
	 To	assess	cognitive	ability,	we	used	tasks	that	measure	executive	function	(EF)	
and	language.		Executive	function	develops	in	the	frontal	lobe	refers	to	the	functions	of	
working	memory,	cognitive	flexibility,	and	self-control	(Miyake	et	al.,	2000).		Working	
memory	refers	to	the	ability	to	hold	and	manipulate	information	in	short	term	memory	
and	cognitive	flexibility	is	the	ability	to	shift	attention	in	response	to	different	demands	
or	to	apply	different	rules	in	different	settings	(Miyake	et	al.,	2000).		These	particular	
cognitive	abilities	were	assessed	because	they	are	directly	related	to	cognitive	
development.		To	assess	philosophical	reasoning,	we	used	a	child-friendly	story	with	a	
series	of	philosophical	questions	meant	to	assess	the	ability	to	think	in	a	philosophical	
manner.		This	measure	was	added	to	assess	whether	or	not	philosophical	reasoning	
influenced	everyday	decisions	of	conformity	and	self-regulation.	
There	were	three	research	questions	addressed	in	this	empirical	section	of	my	paper:	
1) Is	EF	and	language	related	to	philosophical	ability?	
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a. Kitchener	(1990)	bases	his	claims	strongly	on	Jean	Piaget’s	theory	of	
cognitive	development	and	asserts	that	due	to	their	underdevelopment	
of	cognition,	children	are	unable	to	engage	in	philosophy.	Murris	says,	
“Merely	assuming	that	childhood	is	connected	to	a	particular	biological,	
psychological	or	social	age	is	unsatisfactory.	It	also	limits	cognitive	
development	to	include	merely	logico-mathematical	thinking,	and	
ignores	imaginative	development,”	(Murris,	200,	pp.	272).	
b. Given	that	both	Kitchener	and	Murris	discuss	the	importance	of	cognition	
in	philosophy,	I	sought	to	provide	empirical	evidence	linking	the	two	
together	in	both	an	adult	and	child	sample.		If	they	are	linked,	it	would	
suggest	that	engaging	children	with	philosophy	should	be	scaled	as	is	all	
other	academic	curricula.		
2) How	do	children	compare	to	adults	in	philosophical	reasoning?	
a. Murris	(2000)	assertion	that	children	cannot	do	philosophy	because	they	
do	not	live	a	philosophical	lifestyle	is	akin	to	saying	children	cannot	do	
math	because	they	are	not	mathematicians.	To	provide	evidence	of	early	
philosophical	reasoning	I	examined	what	level	children	were	able	
philosophize	on	an	age	appropriate	task	compared	to	adults.	
3) Does	philosophical	reasoning	influence	conformity	behavior?	
a. 	The	reason	for	including	this	task	is	to	see	if	they	apply	philosophical	
reasoning	to	everyday	decisions	(i.e.,	do	others’	choices	influence	self-
regulation?)		I	think	Murris	and	Kitchener	would	say	one	of	the	reasons	
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that	philosophy	is	so	important	is	that	it	lets	you	question	things	in	your	
everyday	life	and	think	about	the	world	in	a	higher	level,	so	I	wanted	to	
see	if	that	is	the	case	with	adults	as	well	as	children.	.		
III.2	Methods	for	the	Empirical	Study	
Participants	
Fifty-two	undergraduates	(37	female,	12	male)	from	a	mid-sized	state	university	
in	the	south	ages	18	–	22	years	(Mage=19.06,	SD	=	.95),	participated	in	the	study	in	
exchange	for	course	credit	in	an	introductory	psychology	course.		
Six	children	(5	male,	1	female;	1	Hispanic,	2	African	American,	3	Caucasian)	ages	
7	–	9	years	(Mage	=	7.8	years,	SD	=	.84),	from	a	small	town	in	the	Southern	United	states	
participated	in	exchange	for	prizes.	
Procedure	
	 Participants	completed	a	battery	of	tasks	in	a	fixed	order	examining	executive	
function	(i.e.,	Dimension	Change	Card	Sort	Task,	backward	digit	span),	language	(i.e.,	
Wechsler’s	Abbreviated	Scale	of	Intelligence	Vocabulary	Test),	the	ability	to	think	
philosophically,	and	likelihood	to	conform.		A	sarcasm	detection	and	faux	pas	
understanding	task	was	also	completed	but	was	out	of	the	scope	of	the	present	study.	
Both	children	and	adults	completed	the	same	tasks.		
Measures	
	 Dimension	Change	Card	Sort	(DCCS).	This	task	measured	cognitive	flexibility	by	
having	children	switch	between	rules	(Zelazo,	2006).	Participants	sat	across	from	an	
experimenter,	who	placed	two	metal	sorting	bins	with	two	target	cards	affixed	to	the	
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bins	(i.e.,	a	blue	bunny	and	red	boat)	facing	the	child.		In	pre-switch	trials,	participants	
were	presented	with	sorting	cards	(i.e.,	blue	boats	and	red	bunnies)	and	asked	to	
execute	the	first	sorting	rule	based	on	one	dimension	(e.g.,	sort	by	color	so	that	the	red	
bunny	matched	to	the	red	sailboat	target	card).	Next,	participants	were	presented	with	
six	post-switch	trials	in	which	they	sorted	the	cards	by	the	competing	dimension	that	
required	participants	to	view	the	stimuli	in	a	different	manner	(e.g.,	sort	by	shape	and	
now	match	the	red	bunny	to	the	blue	bunny).	Finally,	the	participants	were	presented	
with	12	borders	trials	in	which	they	were	asked	to	sort	by	both	color	and	shape	
depending	on	whether	or	not	the	card	had	a	border	around	the	image	(e.g.,	if	the	card	
had	a	border,	sort	by	color,	if	not	sort	by	shape).	The	dimension	of	the	pre	and	post-
switch	was	counterbalanced.	The	order	of	the	cards	was	randomly	determined	with	the	
stipulation	that	no	more	than	2	of	the	same	cards	were	presented	consecutively,	and	
this	random	order	was	applied	to	all	participants.		Participants	had	to	get	11	out	of	12	
trials	correct	to	pass	the	borders	trials,	with	the	dependent	variable	being	the	number	
of	correct	borders	trials.		The	children	were	reminded	of	the	rules	for	each	card,	the	
adults	were	not.	
	 Backward	Digit	Span.		This	task	was	used	to	assess	working	memory	by	having	
participants	hold	single	digits	in	mind	and	manipulate	them	by	repeating	them	
backwards	(Carlson,	Moses,	&	Breton,	2002).		Participants	were	first	presented	with	two	
training	trials	where	two	numbers	and	the	rule	were	presented	(i.e.,	“if	I	say	1,2,	you	
would	say	2,1.		If	I	say	3,4	what	would	you	say?”).		If	participants	were	incorrect	on	
training	trials,	the	experimenter	would	correct	them	and	present	the	trial	again.		
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Participants	had	to	pass	training	by	correctly	reproducing	2	numbers	backward	to	move	
on	to	the	testing	phase,	of	which	all	participants	did.		In	the	testing	phase,	the	number	
of	digits	participants	had	to	reproduce	backward	started	at	a	three-digit	span	and	
increased	as	participants	progressed	in	the	tasks.	Participants	were	presented	with	
three	trials	of	each	digit	span	(e.g.,	3-digit	span)	before	moving	on	to	the	next	digit	span	
(e.g.,	4-digit	span).		Testing	was	terminated	at	a	digit	span	of	eight	or	when	the	
participant	gave	three	incorrect	responses	consecutively,	with	the	dependent	variable	
being	the	highest	digit	span.		
	 Wechsler’s	Abbreviated	Scale	of	Intelligence	(WASI)	Vocabulary	Subscale.		This	
standardized	task	appropriate	for	participants	from	6	to	90	years	of	age	assessed	verbal	
intelligence	by	presenting	a	list	of	words	to	participants,	which	they	had	to	define	to	the	
best	of	their	ability	(Wechsler,	1999).		Participants’	responses	were	scored	based	on	the	
WASI	criteria	for	each	item.	There	were	27	trials	possible	and	testing	ended	when	
participants	received	a	“0”	three	consecutive	times	(e.g.,	answered	I	don’t	know	or	gave	
incorrect	definitions	for	a	word)	or	when	they	reached	the	27th	trial.	Raw	scores	based	
on	the	highest	trial	reached	and	quality	of	definitions	(Wechsler,	1999)	were	calculated.		
	 Philosophical	Reasoning	Task.		This	task	was	developed	to	assess	the	capability	
of	philosophical	thought	as	described	in	Parts	I	and	II,	and	examine	how	philosophical	
thought	may	influence	later	reasoning.	Participants	were	read	Frog	on	a	Log,	a	story	
about	a	frog	who	is	told	to	conform	to	a	behavior	(i.e.,	sitting	on	a	log)	and	were	
randomly	assigned	to	2	conditions	where	they	were	either	asked	philosophical	or	factual	
questions	about	the	story.	In	the	philosophical	questions	condition,	participants	were	
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asked	questions	that	were	thought	to	employ	higher-order	and	abstract	thinking	and	
reasoning	skills	(i.e.,	are	they	able	to	think	beyond	the	limitations	of	the	book	and	
respond	abstractly	or	generalize	the	material	in	the	book	to	apply	it	to	real-world	
situations,	see	Appendix	A).		In	the	control	condition	participants	were	asked	memory	
and	comprehension	based	questions	at	similar	points	in	the	story,	but	at	a	non-
philosophical	level	(e.g.,	where	does	the	frog	want	to	sit?,	see	Appendix	B).	This	allowed	
for	a	comparison	group	of	individuals	to	examine	how	philosophically	consideration	of	a	
story	may	influence	later	thought	compared	questions	that	examined	the	story	at	a	less	
abstract	and	philosophical	level.	Children	only	completed	the	philosophical	questions	
due	to	the	small	sample	size.				
To	develop	a	set	of	philosophical	questions,	experts	in	philosophy	(i.e.,	
undergraduate	students,	graduate	students,	and	professors	with	a	philosophical	
background)	were	asked	to	rate	a	series	of	questions	on	what	they	were	assessing:	(1)	
strictly	memory/comprehension	(e.g.	what	color	was	the	cat?),	(2)	lower-order	thinking	
–	reasoning,	critical	thinking	(e.g.	why	shouldn’t	the	frog	sit	on	the	log?)	(3)	higher-order	
thinking	–		meta-cognition,	imposing	meaning	(e.g.	when	would	it	be	best	not	to	do	
what	you	are	told?),	or	(4)	abstract	in	nature	(e.g.	do	you	know	anyone	like	the	frog?).		
The	higher	scores	were	deemed	more	philosophical	by	philosophy	experts	due	to	their	
engagement	with	higher-order	thinking	skills	and	employment	of	more	abstract	
concepts.		The	control	group	received	only	questions	in	groups	that	were	rated	as	
memory	or	lower	order	thinking	and	the	philosophy	group	received	questions	in	groups	
1	–	4	to	gauge	ability	of	all	types.		Questions	were	asked	throughout	the	story	telling	
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after	reading	the	page(s)	corresponding	to	the	question(s).		The	goal	of	the	questions	
was	to	engage	participants	in	a	philosophical	conversation	in	which	they	think	about	the	
story,	the	epistemological	and	moral	implications	of	it,	take	those	abstract	ideas	and	
generalize	them	across	their	everyday	life,	therefore	(hopefully)	employing	their	higher-
order	thinking	skills.	
As	one	goal	of	this	task	was	to	examine	philosophical	reasoning,	we	scored	the	
participant	responses	to	questions	on	the	level	of	philosophical	thought	exhibited	in	
each	response.	Responses	of	the	participants	were	scored	on	a	0-3	scale	(see	Appendix	
A	and	B	for	scoring	codes).		The	dependent	variable	was	the	total	number	of	points	
responses	received.	(See	Appendix	A	and	B	for	scoring	codes.)	
	 Conformity	Behavior	Task.	Another	goal	of	the	study	was	to	examine	how	
philosophical	thought	might	influence	later	philosophical	reasoning	in	a	real-world	
scenario	as	part	of	higher-order	and	abstract	thinking	skills.		To	examine	this	question,	
we	presented	participants	with	a	task	to	assess	if	philosophical	prompting	would	have	
an	impact	on	conformity	behavior.		In	this	task,	children	were	presented	with	two	
choices,	a	more	attractive	toy	(e.g.,	a	colorful,	animal-shaped	eraser)	and	a	“plain”	toy	
(e.g.,	a	plain	white	eraser).		Children	were	told	that	all	the	other	children	chose	the	
“plain”	prize,	but	they	could	choose	which	ever	they	liked.		Children’s	response	to	the	
choice	was	recorded	with	a	plain	selection	thought	to	reflect	more	conformity	and	the	
attractive	selection	thought	to	reflect	more	individual	thought.		To	check	that	our	
attractive	prizes	were	actually	considered	to	be	more	attractive	to	children,	we	had	two	
selections	(i.e.,	stickers	and	erasers).	Half	of	the	children	made	the	conformity	selection	
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with	the	stickers	and	then	were	asked	to	rate	their	preference	of	the	erasers	and	vice	
versa,	so	we	had	data	on	the	actual	preference	of	both	the	stickers	and	erasers.		
	 For	the	adults,	we	designed	a	similar	task	under	the	guise	of	a	smell	perception	
task,	since	stickers	and	erasers	are	not	necessarily	desirable	for	adults.		In	this	task,	an	
experimenter	asked	participants	to	identify	the	better	smelling	scent	between	two	
identical	candles.		We	told	the	participants	that	they	would	be	doing	a	smell	perception	
task	in	which	they	must	see	if	they	can	identify	the	subtle	difference	between	the	two	
candles,	and	then	identify	which	one	they	prefer.		The	experimenter	then	indicated	one	
candle	that	“most”	participants	preferred.		Their	responses	were	marked	as	follows:	
same	preference	as	others	(indicated	by	experimenter)	–	conform,	different	preference	
than	others	–	did	not	conform,	and	noted	they	were	the	same	–	did	not	conform.		After	
they	gave	us	their	preference,	we	debriefed	them	and	told	them	the	two	candles	were	
identical	and	that	the	candle	that	had	been	pointed	out	as	most	preferred	was	not.	
III.3	Results		
Research	Question	1:	Is	cognition	related	to	philosophical	thinking?	
	 For	adults,	higher	scores	on	the	philosophical	reasoning	questions	were	related	
to	year	in	college	r(13)=.55,	p=.04,	and	marginally	related	to	working	memory	
performance	r(15)=.43,	p=.09.	Philosophical	reasoning	was	not	related	to	number	
correct	on	the	flexibility	task,	r(15)=-.36,	p=.15,	or	total	correct	on	the	verbal	abilities	
task,	r(15)=.17,	p=.52.	(See	Table	1)	
For	the	children,	the	only	marginal	correlation	to	the	philosophy	scores	were	the	
total	correct	on	the	verbal	abilities	task,	r(5)=.84,	p=.07.		Philosophical	reasoning	was	
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not	related	to	number	correct	on	the	flexibility	task	,	r(5)=.32,	p=.60,	or	working	
memory	performance	,	r(5)=.22,	p=.73.	(See	Table	1)	
Research	Question	2:	How	do	children	compare	to	adults	on	an	age	appropriate	
philosophy	task?	
With	reading	a	child-friendly	story	and	questioning	participants	in	such	a	way	to	
prompt	philosophical	reasoning,	we	found	that	there	was	no	significant	difference	
between	children	and	adults,	t(20)=1.16,	p=.26.,	despite	doing	better	on	EF	and	
language.	(See	Table	2)	
Research	Question	3:	Does	philosophical	training	in	adults	influence	conformity	
behavior?	
We	did	not	find	a	significant	difference	between	the	philosophy	and	control	
group	in	the	conformity	task.		The	adult	participants	who	received	philosophical	
reasoning	questions	did	not	conform	less	than	(M=.29,	SD=.47)	those	who	received	
general	reasoning	questions,	(M=.26,	SD=.45),	t(34)=.20,	p=.84.	Nor	was	it	the	case	that	
participants	who	chose	not	to	conform	answered	in	a	more	philosophical	manner	
(M=26.5	SD=3.18)	compared	to	those	who	chose	to	conform	(M=28.8,	SD=3.35),	
t(15)=.20,	p=.20.	(See	Figure	1)		
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Part	4:	Discussion	
	 Cognition	and	executive	functions	do	seem	to	be	marginally	related	to	
philosophical	abilities	in	both	adults	and	children.		Children	appear	to	be	doing	as	well	
as,	if	not	better,	than	adults	on	this	particular	philosophical	task	despite	cognitive	
differences.			This	supports	Murris’	claim	that	children	CAN	do	philosophy	(2000)	and	
rejects	Kitchener’s	claim	that	children	under	the	age	of	10	cannot	philosophize	(1990).		
We	did	not	find	that	conformity	was	influenced	by	philosophical	training	as	we	
hypothesized.	
	 The	data	for	our	first	question	of	whether	or	not	there	is	a	correlation	between	
cognition	and	philosophical	reasoning	skills.		For	the	undergraduate	data,	we	found	that	
there	was	a	relation	between	the	classification	of	the	participant	in	college	and	their	
philosophical	reasoning.	This	is	could	be	due	to	the	amount	and	variety	of	information	
the	participants	have	been	exposed	to	and	how	they	are	able	to	reflect	on	it.	We	also	
found	a	marginal	correlation	between	philosophical	reasoning	and	working	memory.	
Working	memory	deals	with	perceptual	and	linguistic	processes,	which	are	important	in	
philosophical	engagement	(e.g.,	hold	information,	such	as	multiple	theories/concepts,	in	
mind	and	reflect	on	it).		For	the	children,	we	found	marginal	correlation	between	verbal	
intelligence	and	philosophy	scores.		I	think	this	could	suggest	that	the	amount	of	
information	children	have	learned	in	school	enables	them	to	reason	and	think	abstractly	
at	a	higher	level,	as	suggested	by	Plato’s	educational	system.		It	should	be	taken	into	
consideration	that	we	were	limited	with	the	sample	size	and	were	only	able	to	test	6	
children,	1	of	which	received	control	questions.	
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	 With	the	second	question	of	how	children	and	adults	compare,	the	results	
indicate	that	despite	the	cognitive	differences	on	the	executive	function	and	verbal	
intelligence	tasks,	the	children’s	philosophical	scores	were	as	good	as,	if	not	better	than	
the	adults.		It	should	be	noted	that	the	children	were	scored	with	the	same	code	as	the	
adults,	however,	they	were	scored	based	on	addressing	the	topic	listed	rather	than	
using	the	language/vocabulary	that	the	adults	used	(see	Appendix	A	for	philosophy	
scoring	code).		I	think	ideas	asserted	by	philosopher	Ludwig	Wittgenstein	can	help	us	to	
understand	this.		Wittgenstein	proposes	that	misconceptions	of	language	create	
philosophical	problems.		Kitchener	addresses	this	and	Mathews’	argument	that	by	
introducing	philosophical	ideas	at	a	young	age,	we	would	be	helping	to	avoid	later,	
unnecessary	problems.		Because	they	have	not	yet	formed	biases,	children	can	
philosophize	without	misconceptions	(Kitchener,	1990,	pp.	266).		Adults	might	have	
been	thinking	to	concretely	about	the	ideas	and	children,	because	they	do	not	yet	have	
as	many	misconceptions	in	language	(e.g.,	multiple	meanings	for	words)	they	are	able	to	
think	more	freely.		While	we	see	with	the	adult	data	that	classification	does	lead	to	
higher	philosophy	scores,	we	need	to	take	into	consideration	Murris’	claim	that	we	
cannot	rely	solely	on	biological	or	psychological	age.		We	must	look	to	individual	
differences	within	individuals	and	assess	their	abilities	individualistically	rather	than	by	
group	(Murris,	2000,	pp.	272).	
As	for	the	third	research	question	of	whether	or	not	philosophical	engagement	
influences	conformity	behavior,	we	did	not	find	a	difference	between	the	non-
philosophically	questioned	participants	and	the	participants	that	received	the	
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philosophy	questions	on	the	conformity	task.		This	might	be	due	to	the	type	of	
conformity	task	we	used.		We	deceived	the	adults	in	telling	them	they	were	doing	a	
smell	perception	task	and	that	one	candle	was	preferred.		By	informing	them	that	there	
were	subtle	differences	in	the	candles,	they	might	have	actually	believed	that	
differences	were	there,	even	though	they	were	identical.		We	did	not	answer	this	
question	for	the	children	due	to	the	very	small	pool	of	participants,	six	children	were	
tested	only	one	of	which	were	given	the	control	questions.	
	 Some	of	the	limitations	of	this	study	were	the	short	time	frame	to	gather	data	
from	kids,	the	small	pool	of	kids	for	age	range	(7-9).		There	was	not	much	variability	of	
adult	data	insofar	as	major	and	philosophy	courses	taken	are	concerned.		For	future	
research,	we	would	like	to	have	more	participants	with	a	background	in	philosophy	to	
compare	to	philosophy	minors/majors	to	the	other	participants,	add	a	psychological	
flexibility	task	to	compare	to	cognitive	flexibility.		
	 In	conclusion,	this	data	supports	the	theory	that	children,	even	those	under	the	
age	of	ten,	can	engage	in	a	philosophical	discussion	and	reflect	and	convey	their	beliefs,	
ideas,	and	values.		More	research	should	be	done	on	this,	especially	looking	at	the	
effects	of	long	term	exposure	to	philosophical	instruction.		I	believe	integrating	
philosophy	as	a	curriculum	into	educational	institutions	starting	at	elementary	(maybe	
even	younger)	would	be	beneficial	to	the	students	in	an	academic	and	personal	manner.		
Those	that	participate	in	Philosophy	for	Children	(P4C)	instruction	have	shown	to	
improve	in	other	academic	areas,	such	as	Math,	English,	and	Reading	(Gorard	et	al.,	
2016).		Engaging	in	Philosophy	does	not	only	help	one	to	better	articulate	beliefs	and	
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opinions,	but	aids	in	improving	logical	reasoning	and	self-regulation	do	to	the	concepts	
one	is	encouraged	to	reflect	on.		For	this	reason	and	due	to	the	results	given,	I	agree	
with	Murris	that	children	should	be	encouraged	to	participate	in	philosophical	
discussions	to	promote	their	abilities	at	a	level	that	is	appropriate	to	their	cognitive	
development.	
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APPENDICES	
Table 1 
      
Correlations Among Study Variables          
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Adults  
1. Philosophy Score 1.00  
    
2. Philosophy Classes .12 1.00  
   
3. Classification  .55* .38 1.00    
4. DCCS -.36 -.16 -.41 1.00   
5. Backward Digit .43 -.04 .10 -.38 1.00  
6. WASI .17 -.69** -.15 .14 .17 1.00 
 
Children  
1. Age 1.00      
2. DCCS .76 1.00     
3. Backward Digit .76 .58 1.00  
  
4. WASI .75 .64 .53 1.00  
 
5. Philosophy Score .28 .33 .21 .84 1.00  
	
Note:	For	the	undergraduate	data,	we	found	that	there	was	a	for	the	classification	of	the	
participant	in	college	and	their	philosophical	reasoning.	We	also	found	a	marginal	
correlation	between	philosophical	reasoning	and	working	memory.		For	the	children,	we	
found	marginal	correlation	between	verbal	intelligence	and	philosophy	scores.		Again,	
we	were	limited	with	the	sample	size	and	were	only	able	to	test	6	children,	1	of	which	
received	control	questions.	
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Table 2 
   
Descriptive Statistics 
     M (SD) Range n 
Adults 
1. Classification  3.43 (.86) 3 - 6 17 
2. DCCS 11.03 (1.63) 4 - 12 17 
3. Backward Digit 4.36 (1.48) 1 - 8 17 
4. WASI 33.81 (4.69) 22 -42 17 
5. Philosophy Score 27.18 (3.30) 19 - 33 17 
Children 
1. Age 7.80 (.84) 7 - 9 5 
2. DCCS 9.60 (2.19) 6 - 11 5 
3. Backward Digit 3.40 (.55) 3 - 4  5 
4. WASI 24.60 (5.03) 17 - 29 5 
5. Philosophy Score 29.00 (2.12) 26 - 31 5 
	
Note:	The	results	indicate	that	despite	the	cognitive	differences	on	the	executive	
function	and	verbal	intelligence	tasks,	the	children’s	philosophical	scores	were	as	good	
as,	if	not	better	than	the	adults.	The	children	were	scored	with	the	same	code	as	the	
adults,	however,	they	were	scored	based	on	addressing	the	topic	listed	rather	than	
using	the	language/vocabulary	that	the	adults	used.	(See	Appendix	A	for	philosophy	
scoring	code)	
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Figure	1		
Adult	Conformity	Task	
	
	
	
Note:	We	did	not	find	a	difference	between	the	philosophically	questioned	participants	
and	the	non-philosophically	questioned	participants	in	their	conformity	behavior.	 	
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
Philosophy	 Control	
Conformity	
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Appendix	A	
Philosophy	Questions/Scoring	
1. Do	you	think	the	frog	should	sit	on	the	log?			
2. If	someone	tells	you	to	do	something,	but	it	makes	you	uncomfortable,	do	you	
have	to	do	it?		
3. The	frog	says	that	he	can	stretch	out	on	the	sofa.	Just	because	he	can,	should	
he?	If	he	is	taking	another	animal’s	place	is	it	wrong?	Why?	
4. Do	you	agree	with	the	Cat	that	the	right	thing	is	to	sit	where	you	are	told,	or	do	
you	agree	with	the	frog	that	comfortability	is	more	important?	Why?		
5. Is	it	wrong	for	someone	not	to	do	something	they	are	told	to	do	because	it	
makes	them	uncomfortable?	Yes	or	No,	Why?	
6. Do	you	think	that	all	of	the	animals	are	happy	why/why	not?	Yes	or	No,	Why?	
7. If	we	don’t	have	the	cat	telling	us	where	to	go,	how	can	we	find	our	special	
place?	
8. Would	the	animals	be	better	off	if	there	were	no	rules?	Yes	or	No	
9. When	would	it	be	best	for	you	not	to	do	what	you’re	told?		
When	would	it	be	best	for	you	to	do	what	you’re	told?	
10. Do	you	think	most	people	are	happy	to	be	in	their	assigned	places?	Why?	
11. Do	you	know	anyone	like	the	Frog?	Who?	How	are	they	like	the	Frog?	
12. 	Do	you	know	anyone	like	the	cat?	Who?	How	are	they	like	the	Cat?	
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Philosophy	Scoring	
1. Do	you	think	the	frog	should	sit	on	the	log?	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	+	use	example	from	book;	no,	it’s	hard/uncomfortable/splinters,	etc	
3	–	go	beyond	book;	no,	he	can	make	his	own	decisions,	not	listen	to	others	
2. 	If	someone	tells	you	to	do	something,	but	it	makes	you	uncomfortable,	do	you	
have	to	do	it?		
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	+	you	can	make	own	decisions	
3	–	take	into	consideration	authority/others	
3. 	The	frog	says	that	he	can	stretch	out	on	the	sofa.	Just	because	he	can,	should	
he?		
If	he	is	taking	another	other	animal’s	place	is	it	wrong?	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	+	if	he	wants	
3	–	take	into	consideration	others	(others,	other	animals,	sharing);	if	answer	is	
about	chaos,	get	them	to	explain	
4. Do	you	agree	with	the	Cat	that	the	right	thing	is	to	sit	where	you	are	told,	or	do	
you	agree	with	the	frog	that	being	comfortable	and	happy	is	more	important?	
Why?		
1	–	I	agree	with	___	
2	–	I	agree	with	___	because	____	
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3	–	considering	consequences	of	actions/	or	situational	variability/	credibility	of	
cat/	morality/	definition	of	“right”	
5. 	Is	it	wrong	for	someone	not	to	do	what	they	are	told	because	it	makes	them	
uncomfortable?		
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	you	can	make	your	own	choices,	nobody	can	tell	you	what	to	do	
3	–	yes/no/both	considers	authority/situational	variability	
6. Do	you	think	that	all	of	the	animals	are	happy	why/why	not?	Yes	or	No	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	they	don’t	look	happy,	their	places	don’t	fit,	they’re	not	comfy	
3	–	go	beyond	observation	of	book,	they	didn’t	choose	their	place,	they	have	no	
choice	and	everyone	should,	relate	to	the	frog	questioning	authority	 	
7. 	If	we	don’t	have	the	cat	telling	us	where	to	go,	how	can	we	find	our	special	
place?	
1	–	answer	
2	–	answer	+	reason	
3	–	finding	where	we	fit	and	what	makes	us	happy	
8. Would	the	animals	be	better	off	if	there	were	no	rules?	Yes	or	No	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	+	choice	and	comfortability	is	important	
3	–	consider	importance	of	rules	in	society,	sometimes	what	is	best	for	others	is	
more	important	than	being	comfortable/happy	
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9. When	would	be	best	for	you	not	to	do	what	you’re	told?		
When	would	it	be	best	for	to	you	do	what	you’re	told?	
1	–	you	should	always	do	what	you’re	told	
2	–	specific	example	
3	–	abstract;	taking	into	consideration	harm	of	others,	authority,	morality	
10. Do	you	think	most	people	are	happy	to	be	in	their	assigned	places?	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	+	talk	about	skills	(they	were	assigned	their	because	they’re	good	
something)	
3	–	talk	about	what	it	means	to	be	happy,	and	what	it	means	to	be	happy	in	
accordance	with	skills,	dreams,	goals	(ex.	I	like	to	sing	but	I’m	not	good	at	it,	I	like	
tutoring	because	I’m	good	at	it,	I	don’t	like	____	because	I’m	not	good	at	it,	I	
don’t	like	____	even	though	I’m	good	at	it)	
11	&	12.	Do	you	know	anyone	like	the	Frog?	Do	you	know	anyone	like	the	cat?	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	specific	person	without	reasoning	
3	-		yes/no	example	with	reasoning;	she	bosses	me	around,	she	asks	a	lot	of	
questions,	doesn’t	go	with	flow,	people	who	are	manipulative,	people	who	don’t	
like	being	told	what	to	do		
36	possible	points	in	all	
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Appendix	B	
Control	Questions/Scoring	
1. Does	the	frog	want	to	sit	on	the	log?		Why/Why	not?	
2. Where	would	the	frog	like	to	sit?	
3. Does	the	cat	think	it’s	important	to	be	comfortable?	
4. What	do	gorillas	sit	on?		
5. Do	you	think	the	gorilla	is	happy?	Why/Why	not?	
6. Where	did	the	dog	sit?		
Describe	the	dog.	
7. What	color	was	the	cat?			
Describe	the	cat.	
8. What	did	the	sign	say	that	the	frog	was	holding?	
9. Where	did	the	frog	stretch	out?	
10. What	sits	on	sofas?	
11. What	do	all	the	animals	and	their	special	places	have	in	common?	
12. Name	as	many	animals	and	their	special	places	as	you	can.	
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Control	Scoring	
1. Does	the	frog	want	to	sit	on	the	log?		Why/Why	not?	
0	–	incorrect	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	with	appropriate	reason	
2. Where	would	the	frog	like	to	sit?	
0	-	Incorrect	
1	-	Names	one	correct	place	
2	-	Names	multiple	correct	places	
3. Does	the	cat	think	it’s	important	to	be	comfortable?	
0	–	I	don’t	know/incorrect	(yes)	
1	–	no		
4. What	do	gorillas	sit	on?		
0	–	incorrect	
1	-	pillar	
5. Do	you	think	the	gorilla	is	happy?	Why/Why	not?	
0	–	I	don’t	know	
1	–	yes/no	
2	–	yes/no	with	appropriate	response	
6. Where	did	the	dog	sit?	(on	frog)	
Describe	the	dog.	(could	say	personality,	or	physical	–	spotted,	brown,	white,	
floppy	ears,	long	nose,	etc.)	
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0	–	I	don’t	know	
1	–	answers	1	correctly	
2	–	answers	both	correctly	
7. What	color	was	the	cat?		(grey,	grey	&	white)	
Describe	the	cat.	(personality)	
0	–	I	don’t	know/	incorrect	
1	–	answers	1	correctly	
2	–	answers	both	correctly	
8. What	did	the	sign	say	that	the	frog	was	holding?	
0	–	I	don’t	know/incorrect	
1	-	help	
9. Where	did	the	frog	stretch	out?	
0	–	I	don’t	know/incorrect	
1	-	sofa	
10. What	sits	on	sofas?	
0	–	I	don’t	know/incorrect	
1	-	gophers	
11. What	do	all	the	animals	and	their	special	places	have	in	common?	
0	–	I	don’t	know	
1	–	places	rhyme	with	names	
2	–	told	where	to	sit,	etc.	(specify	answer	if	not	“place	rhymes	with	name”)	
12. Name	as	many	animals	and	their	special	places	as	you	can.		
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30	possible	answers	
1	point	per	correct	animal/place	pair	
Qs	1-11	offer	17	possible	points	altogether	
	
	 	
